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Welcome to edition 54 of the Capco Institute Journal of 
Financial Transformation. 
In this edition we explore recent transformative developments 
in the insurance industry, through Capco’s Global Insurance 
Survey of consumers in 13 key markets, which highlights that 
the future of insurance will be personalized, digitalized, and 
connected. Other important papers cover topics high on global 
corporate and political agendas, from ESG and climate change 
to arti cial intelligence and regulation.
The insurance industry has been undergoing transformation 
in recent years, with insurers responding to the needs and 
expectation of tomorrow’s customers, for products that were 
tailored,  exible, and available anytime, anyplace, and at a 
competitive price. 
COVID-19 has accelerated such change, forcing insurers to 
immediately implement programs to ensure they can continue 
selling their products and services in digital environments 
without face-to-face interaction. New entrants have also 
spurred innovation, and are reshaping the competitive 
landscape, through digital transformation.
The contributions in this edition come from a range of 
world-class experts across industry and academia in our 
continued effort to curate the very best expertise, independent 
thinking and strategic insight for a future-focused  nancial 
services sector.
As ever, I hope you  nd the latest edition of the Capco Journal 
to be engaging and informative. 
Thank you to all our contributors and thank you for reading. 
 
Lance Levy, Capco CEO
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been proved to have ambiguous wording that is open to 
interpretation, or are linked to property, equipment damage, or 
inaccessibility [OECD (2021)] that are more relevant to other 
disasters, such as  re or  ood, but not relevant to a pandemic. 
In addition, only a few businesses have policies in place that 
would cover these types of losses [OECD (2021)]. Going 
forward, given its systemic nature [Schanz et al. (2020)], 
insurance  rms are likely to exclude insurance cover for 
pandemic risk [OECD (2021)]. Alternatively, if such insurance is 
made available, to cover the range and magnitude of potential 
losses it will likely be unaffordable for most businesses, 
thus resulting in an “insurance protection gap” [Jarzabkowski 
et al. (2018)]. 
Insurance protection gaps are often addressed by national 
government interventions into the insurance industry 
[Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)]. Examples of gaps include 
 ooding risk in the U.K., earthquake risk in California, 
or commercial property terrorism risk in Australia. The 
government interventions, designed to ensure continuity of 
insurance in the face of extreme events [Jarzabkowski et al. 
(2019), McAneny et al. (2016)], are referred to as “protection 
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO PANDEMIC 
RISK: REMOVAL AND/OR REDISTRIBUTION
1. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has, in addition to causing losses 
of lives and “social normality”, severely affected the global 
economy and economic activity [Brammer et al. (2020)]. This 
was largely the result of measures taken to prevent the disease 
from spreading [OECD (2021)]. The OECD (2021) estimates 
that, in the U.K., one month of government restrictions costs 
businesses about U.S.$88 billion (~£64.14 billion). Normally, 
if they have a business interruption (BI) insurance policy, 
losses that affect organizations’ ability to conduct business 
are covered by their insurance policies. However, given the 
severity and the systemic nature of the pandemic, a jarring 
protection gap has been exposed. Systemic risks, meaning 
losses of large scale that occur at the same time across 
many organizations, lines of business, and regions, are too big 
and concurrent to be insurable. The sheer number of losses 
caused by the pandemic would not be possible to cover by the 
insurance industry alone [Schanz et al. (2020)]. In addition, the 
novelty of the nature of COVID-19 led to uncertainties about 
whether or not existing BI insurance policies cover pandemic 
risk. For example, many business interruption policies have 
ABSTRACT
The pandemic has an ongoing  nancial impact on the global economy, resulting in its uninsurability and ultimately an 
insurance protection gap. While solutions exist to address other protection gaps caused by large-scale disasters such 
as repeated  ooding, earthquakes, and terrorism, pandemics differ and require novel solutions. This paper builds on 
Jarzabkowski et al.’s (2018) strategic response framework to large-scale, catastrophic disasters and applies it to the 
pandemic insurance protection gap. Set in the U.K. context, the research empirically studies various insurance solutions 
that are being proposed for pandemic risk and presents and evaluates four types of responses. 
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2.1 Removal
Removing risk is a response that removes the risk from the 
(insurance) market onto the balance sheet of the protection 
gap entities, and potentially then to the government (vertical 
axis, Figure 1). This response is particularly likely for risk 
that is seen as too volatile or extreme for the market to take. 
Insurance companies may accept premiums from insureds, 
so ensuring that policies can still be issued and serviced, 
and then pass the entire premium associated with this risk 
to the protection gap entities. The PGE can provide the cover 
because it has access to a government guarantee (limited or 
unlimited) to pay for losses, as with the terrorism reinsurance 
scheme Pool Re in the U.K. Alternatively, it can generate its 
own reserves in the private market (e.g., reinsurance) to cover 
losses, as with the California Earthquake Authority (CEA).
gap entities” (PGEs). PGEs are entities that “bring together 
different market and non-market stakeholders in an effort to 
address the protection gap by transforming uninsured risk 
into insurance-based products that can be transferred onto 
government balance sheets or into global  nancial markets 
in order to provide capital for recovery following a disaster” 
[Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)]. In the U.K., examples of PGEs 
include Pool Re and Flood Re, which are single-peril risk pools 
set up to support the private insurance market to provide 
commercial terrorism cover and residential  ood insurance 
cover, respectively.
Globally, PGEs are growing, generating a range of different 
risk-sharing schemes that aim to address protection gaps for 
various large-scale disasters [Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)]. The 
goal of these schemes is broadly to transform uninsured risk 
into insurance products. These can then, at least partially, be 
further transferred to global reinsurance markets in order to 
provide capital for recovery following a disaster. Considered 
as “archetypical forms” of government involvement, PGEs, 
nevertheless, vary considerably in terms of their governance 
structures, the risks covered (e.g., single- or multi-peril), the 
type of risk solution (e.g., insurance versus reinsurance), and 
the funding model (e.g., policyholders’ premiums, public or 
private levy). Despite these differences, PGEs have important 
common underlying principles in their strategic responses to 
protection gaps and how they share risk with market and non-
market parties [Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)]. Speci cally, they 
primarily respond to catastrophic risks by either removing risk 
from the market or redistributing risk across all policyholders 
[Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)]. 
In this paper, we  rst explain how existing protection gap 
entities address insurance protection gaps. We then consider 
some of the solutions to pandemic business interruption 
insurance proposed in the U.K., in order to evaluate whether 
and how protection gap entities can be adapted to address 
systemic risks such as pandemics.
2. A STRATEGIC RESPONSE FRAMEWORK FOR 
PANDEMIC RISK 
This section introduces the strategic response framework to 
catastrophic risk developed by Jarzabkowski et al. (2018). 
These strategic responses can be categorized into various 
degrees of removing risk from the market and redistributing 
it across all policyholders to smooth the price of those at high 
risk (Figure 1).  
Notes:
1    Remove all risk from the market to the PGE/government
2    Remove risk to the PGE and return only some 
to the market (e.g., through reinsurance or 
insurers’ retention)
3    Redistribute all of the risk across all policyholders
4    Redistribute some of the risk across all policyholders
5    Remove risk from the market to the PGE/government AND 
redistribute across all policyholders
Figure 1: Protection gap strategic response framework
Source: Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)
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The extreme position on this dimension is removing the risk 
fully from the market but responses may vary along the 
continuum, by removing only some of the most extreme risks. 
For example, a PGE might remove a “top layer” of risk as 
de ned by market signals, such as withdrawal of insurance 
supply, while risk below a certain threshold is retained by 
insurers in the usual way.
2.2 Redistribution
Redistributing risk is a response that takes the risk of loss 
by a relatively small group of highly exposed policyholders 
and shares it across the wider pool of variably exposed 
policyholders through a subsidy (horizontal axis, Figure 1). 
Low-risk policyholders pay a slightly higher premium than 
they would normally have to based on their actual risk, which 
in turn is used to subsidize affordable premiums for high-
risk policies. The protection gap entity, typically formed as an 
insurance or reinsurance pool, collects the premiums from all 
policyholders and uses the levy to smooth pricing across all 
participants in the risk pool.
Protection gap entities that adopt the strategic response of 
redistributing risk attempt to create a wide pool of insureds, 
in which the premiums of the many policyholders, widely 
distributed across possible exposures, can continue to cover 
the extreme losses of the few. However, they can only do so 
with some government legislation. Examples are the  ood 
insurance scheme Flood Re in the U.K., where a government-
enabled levy on lower-risk policyholders subsidizes higher-risk 
policyholders in order to offer them affordable insurance, or 
the KGV (Cantonal Building Insurance) in Switzerland, where 
a not-for-pro t government monopoly makes insurance 
mandatory so that it can be offered at a  xed affordable price.
2.3 Combination
Removing and redistributing risk are not necessarily either/or 
responses. As demonstrated in Figure 1, PGEs can combine 
risk removal and risk redistribution, albeit not necessarily in 
equal measures. Rather, they may take an approach where 
they remove some elements of risk and redistribute others. 
Often, such changes occur in an evolutionary way. A protection 
gap entity may initially be established to solve, for example, 
the problem of lack of supply for a very volatile risk, such 
as earthquakes or terrorism, through a strategic removal 
response. Once supply begins to return, it might also employ 
some redistribution of risk through industry retentions that 
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are spread across a pool of policyholders. For example, the 
Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC) continues 
to remove that proportion of the terrorism risk for which the 
global (re)insurance industry has neither appetite nor suf cient 
capital. At the same time, ARPC has progressively scaled down 
the level of risk removal and included some risk redistribution 
by pushing insurers to retain more of the terrorism risk losses 
on their own balance sheet to a speci ed threshold that is 
aggregated across the industry.
While these are more or less effective responses to the 
protection gaps caused by large-scale and catastrophic 
disasters such as earthquakes,  oods, and terrorist attacks 
[Jarzabkowski et al. (2018)], pandemics differ [OECD (2021), 
Schanz et al. (2020), Schanz et al. (2021)]. Firstly, they 
are systemic in the sense that especially in the business 
interruption insurance arena, they contain “elements of 
uncontrollable aggregation and correlation which defy 
insurability” [Schanz et al. (2020)]. Secondly, it is complicated 
to know when a speci c pandemic event ends; for example, 
are further waves of infection and lockdown part of a single 
event or are they separate events? Thirdly, the actual cause 
or trigger for the losses is not precise – it is not necessarily 
the speci c contagion of a pandemic per se that causes the 
business interruption, but government decisions for lockdown 
as part of their public policy choices. These characteristics 
make pandemics more problematic to insure, exacerbating 
the “protection gap” issue [Lloyd’s (2020), OECD (2021), 
Schanz et al. (2020)]. Nonetheless, useful lessons can be 
learned from these existing PGEs strategic responses in order 
to consider how to address insurance protection gaps for 
pandemics in the future. We, therefore, explain the principles 
underlying existing PGEs and apply them to evaluate some of 
the pandemic risk-sharing solutions currently proposed.
Our research identi ed four responses to the pandemic based 
on a series of interviews with insurers, reinsurers, government, 
and businesses; observations of key events, industry forums, 
and working groups over the period of 1.5 years; and 
documents including news articles, magazine articles, and 
government announcements. Based on the various solutions 
proposed during the period of our research, some of which 
were also acted upon, we now use the Protection Gap 
Strategic Response Framework to evaluate four potential types 
of responses to pandemic protection gaps (see Figure 2). The 
proposed typology re ects the proposed solutions in the U.K. 
but is also relevant for other jurisdictions.1
1  An earlier version of this appeared in Schanz et al. (2021).
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Broadly, each of these responses intends to protect small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) against business 
interruption from pandemics. However, they vary in terms 
of their design, time scale, scope, product type, and 
degree of industry capitalization [Schanz et al. (2021)]. The 
typology is not intended to re ect any speci c solution, as 
these are currently evolving as the pandemic persists. Rather, 
the aim is to provide a framework for evaluating the range 
of solutions under development according to their key risk-
sharing characteristics.
TYPE 1: LONG-TERM RECOUPING POST-EVENT 
(REDISTRIBUTION WITH SOME REMOVAL)
Type 1 aims to provide businesses with an immediate cash 
injection to support fast recovery. It is a post-event insurance 
product that is paid for over the long term. Backed by a 
government credit risk guarantee, it relies on both government 
capacity and insurance industry commitment. 
Type 1 offers a  exible pricing mechanism where businesses 
can receive a payment immediately during a pandemic but 
must buy multi-year policy contracts from insurers. This 
allows insurers to recover upfront claims costs over the full 
policy term while ensuring the product remains affordable 
for customers by spreading the costs over time. The product, 
therefore, involves mandatory premium payments over a 
pre-agreed policy term (e.g., 10-15 years). In the event of 
premature policy cancellation, businesses face penalties to 
ensure insurers’ claims costs are recovered. To mitigate the 
risk of payment defaults, governments would be required to 
guarantee policyholders’ future premiums.
Given these characteristics, Type 1 is primarily a risk 
redistribution response with some element of risk removal. In 
the short term, the insurance industry covers the risk to pay 
claims without receiving the full premium. This initial industry 
subsidization of the premiums will be redistributed across 
the policyholders through recouping premiums over time via 
a multi-year insurance contract (see Figure 2). At the same 
time, the risk of default on long-term premiums is covered 
by a government guarantee that effectively moves the risk of 
default to the public sector.
This combination approach has two challenges. First, it can 
only work where policyholders are compelled to take out a 
multi-year product. Yet, even with a compulsory, long-term 
recoupment, some businesses may default as a result of other 
disruptions to their business model, cash  ow, and overall 
survival. Hence, embedding a risk-removal mechanism in the 
form of a government backstop is required to guarantee the 
premiums in light of a possible default. Second, regardless 
of whether a guarantee is in place, moral hazard remains a 
problem. Businesses could take the upfront policy despite a 
high uncertainty about whether they will remain robust for the 
life of the policy. For example, many SMEs could be offered 
payments through a recoupment scheme even though they 
have declining or failing business models that will realistically 
not survive. This would require developing careful parameters 
in offering the product. Yet, although some of these businesses 
will fail and be unable to meet the long-term recoupment of 
premiums, the insurance acts as an economic stimulus. At 
the same time, insurers’ own risks are minimized due to the 
government guarantee.
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Notes:
1    Remove risk to the insurance-led PGE and redistribute across all 
policyholders with government guarantee for default
2    Remove risk to the PGE/government and later may return some 
to the market (e.g., through reinsurance or insurer retention)
3    Remove all risk from the market
4    Remove risk partially and temporarily from the market
Figure 2: Four potential responses to the pandemic 
protection gap
Source: Paula Jarzabkowski, adapted from Schanz et al. (2021)
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TYPE 2: DEFINED-EVENT, ROLLING-REVIEW BACKSTOP 
(REMOVAL WITH POTENTIAL FUTURE REDISTRIBUTION)
Type 2 is a large-scale, government-backed premium pool to 
reinsure pandemic-speci c non-damage business interruption 
(NDBI) insurance cover. Typically formed as a public-private 
partnership (PPP), it is largely insurance industry-led in its 
execution but relies on the government as a  nancial backstop 
to cover any claims. 
Under this scheme, insurance  rms design and offer products 
speci cally around pandemic-related NDBI and also collect 
the premiums. These premiums are then paid into a pool that 
acts as the designated reinsurer and provides payments to 
policyholders that are affected by a pandemic-related event 
as de ned in the enabling agreement of the government. 
The government-de ned event is critical because that will 
determine whether and when payments are triggered. While 
the insurance industry administers the scheme, it does 
not retain any of the risks. Instead, the designated 
reinsurance pool will pay all claims. The government provides 
a  nancial backstop of a limited or unlimited guarantee to 
step in if the assets in the pool are exhausted, as might occur 
due to a signi cant national lockdown or a series of medium-
sized lockdowns. 
As observed by Jarzabkowski et al. (2018), government-
guaranteed pools tend to be designed with a (rolling) review 
period. This typically involves a government inquiry every 
three to  ve years to ascertain whether a government 
backstop is needed to ensure ongoing cover, or whether the 
private market can take more or all of the risk. These reviews 
provide an opportunity to increase retention of risk by the 
primary market and to increase the amount of commercial 
reinsurance cover that might trigger prior to the government 
backstop. Rolling reviews enable private market appetite 
and capacity to be reconsidered regularly, incentivizing the 
insurance industry to not simply rely on the government as 
“the insurer of last resort”. The rolling review of Type 2 may, 
therefore, eventually involve some redistribution of risk across 
the insured population, as indicated by the arrow in Figure 2.
TYPE 3: OPEN EVENT, ROLLING-REVIEW 
BACKSTOP (REMOVAL)
While Types 1 and 2 aim to provide protection against 
pandemic risk, Type 3 takes a broader, multi-peril approach. 
It is designed for non-damage business interruption as a 
result of any future systemic events, such as a cyber event, or, 
potentially, the systemic effects of climate change.
In its design, this scheme has similarities to Type 2 but is not 
peril-speci c. Type 3 is intended to be a catch-all for disasters 
that shock the system and hence the exact peril or the event 
that triggers a claim is not speci ed a priori. This scheme 
requires a full government backstop as the private market 
would not be able to operate the scheme given the open 
de nition of both the peril and the event triggers, resulting in 
uncertainty. Yet, the scheme may be executed in the same way 
as Type 2, with premiums being collected against systemic 
risk and paid into a government-designated reinsurance pool 
that can provide a buffer for the government backstop. 
Type 3 recognizes that, just as the COVID-19 pandemic was 
unanticipated, it is dif cult to predict what the next systemic 
disaster will be. The scheme also counters current principles 
of insurance related to indices, models, pricing, and solvency 
requirements. As such, any premium charged would be dif cult, 
if not impossible, to directly link to, or re ect the actual risk of 
a disaster. Hence, Type 3 might be operationalized as a form 
of levy upon insurance policies that would be passed directly 
to the government pool, rather than to a speci ed “systemic 
risk” insurance product that would be sold by insurers, with 
the premium then transferred to the government pool.
As with Type 2, this option would also operate as a risk removal 
scheme. In this scenario, the government would need to declare 
events as systemic, which would then trigger the backstop 
claims related to those declared events. Such systemic risk 
could be another pandemic, a widespread cyberattack, or 
even potentially widespread and unprecedented extreme 
weather disasters, such as the Australia-wide 2019-2020 
bush res, or even the recent 2021 European  ooding, where 
Germany’s government committed €30 bln for reconstruction 
alone [DW (2021)]. In this situation, the term systemic would 
need considerable de nition. For example, if systemic means 
affecting the global economy, of widespread geographic and 
industrial spread, and concurrent, then pandemic  ts the 
de nition, but something like bush res or  ood may be less 
easy to de ne.
The main challenge for Type 3, therefore, is the problem of 
declaring the trigger for such an event. Knowledge about 
which risks are likely to be systemic is continuously evolving 
and risks that are not currently on the horizon at the time 
of designing the protection gap entities may be systemic in 
the future. We suggest that the pool of premium that is built 
up through a Type 3 scheme is partly reinvested to better 
understand which types of risks may be identi ed as systemic 
and to help mitigate against their effects. This could be built 
into a three-to- ve year rolling review process, enabling it to 
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be responsive to emerging risks that are considered systemic. 
More fundamentally, Type 3 is an untested concept. Bundling 
different types of systemic risk, such as pandemic and cyber-
attack, within a single protection gap entity response will 
present major challenges in terms of complexity and exposure.
TYPE 4: PARTIAL, TEMPORARY IMMEDIATE 
SOLUTIONS (REMOVAL) 
Type 4 aims to resolve the lack of appetite from the private 
insurance market for offering insurance products to cover 
losses for speci c business sectors. This includes government-
backed solutions that partially and temporarily remove a 
speci c risk from a business sector to the government 
balance sheet. 
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.K. 
government has introduced three government-backed 
solutions to address sector-speci c risk: (1) the Trade Credit 
Reinsurance Scheme, (2) the Film and Television Production 
Restart Scheme, and (3) the currently proposed Live Events 
Reinsurance Scheme. Each scheme was developed in close 
collaboration between the insurance industry and the U.K. 
government, with claims covered by the government, and 
designed to be temporary solutions rather than to remain in 
place after the COVID-19 crisis. We, therefore, label Type 4 as 
“partial, temporary immediate risk removal” solutions. 
The Trade Credit Reinsurance Scheme was announced in June 
2020 in response to the concerns of both insurance  rms that 
offer trade credit insurance (TCI) and business associations that 
represent SMEs typically with supply chains [Ralph (2020)]. 
The scheme served as a state-backed reinsurance program 
by providing a guarantee of up to £10 bln for insurers to be 
able to continue to offer TCI [ABI (2021)]. Under the scheme, 
the government agreed to reinsure 90% of insurance claims 
and, in exchange, take 90% of the premiums up to a total 
insurer loss ceiling of £3 bln, and 100% of claims between 
£3 bln and £10 bln [BEIS (2020)]. Consequently, despite the 
increased risk of non-payment due to the ongoing pandemic, 
the scheme enabled the provision of trade credit insurance 
to U.K. businesses that allowed them to continue trading on 
credit terms. This provided  nancial liquidity and cash  ow but 
also boosted con dence, ensuring ongoing economic activity. 
Initially set up to run for six months, the scheme was extended 
to the end of June 2021 and has since ceased [ABI (2021)]. 
Yet, there are ongoing concerns that insurers may continue 
to have little appetite to insure businesses that rely on face-
to-face contact such as retail shops, hospitality, and events 
[Smith and Arnold (2021)].
The Film and Television Production Restart Scheme was 
launched by the U.K. government in July 2020 to assist in the 
restart of productions that have been suspended or postponed 
due to the withdrawal of the private insurance market for 
COVID-19 related risks. The government allocated £500 
mln to the scheme to offer insurance for productions against 
losses arising from COVID-19 interruptions, including  lming 
delays and cast and crew illnesses. Production companies 
that meet the eligibility criteria can obtain cover directly from 
the government up to a cap of £5 mln per production for a 
fee of 1% of the production budget. To date, the scheme has 
supported numerous productions and helped save many jobs 
in the  lm and TV industry [DCMS (2021a)]. The scheme, 
which was initially launched to run for six months has been 
extended until December 2021 in order to cover the summer 
shooting schedule.
The Live Events Reinsurance Scheme was launched in the U.K. 
in September 2021 [DCMS (2021b)] after a lengthy period 
of lobbying from the live events and entertainment industry. 
The scheme allows event organizers to buy insurance directly 
from insurance  rms [Payne and Thomas (2021)] and the 
government commits more than £750 mln to costs incurred 
in the event of cancellations due to COVID-19 restrictions 
legally enforced by the U.K. government [DCMS (2021b)]. 
The scheme was initially launched in September 2021 with 
provision to run until September 2022.
Type 4 provides rapid, temporary, government-backed (re)-
insurance solutions to mitigate the consequences of the 
unavailability of (re)insurance arising from pandemic risk. 
These solutions, however, are partial as they aim to cover only 
speci c risks, such as trade credit, or particular sectors, such 
as  lm and TV production or live events. The positive aspect 
of such solutions is that they can be instated rapidly at the 
instigation of the government, without needing to go through 
policy changes or legislation and so can address immediate 
demand. However, the downside is that they are, in turn, 
partial, which means that only a few business sectors can 
be covered according to government decisions about what 
discrete sectors are in critical need. Moreover, their temporary 
nature assumes that the private market will have an appetite 
to re-assume such risk at the end of the current pandemic. As 
that is yet untested, such solutions may eventually need to be 
legislated to become more permanent.
In conclusion, for each of the four types presented, there 
are three key considerations. First, whether the cover is 
mandatory or voluntary. This will determine the size of the 
risk pool and the scope for risk redistribution. Second, each of 
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these options necessitates government involvement to varying 
degrees, either through legislation to support redistribution or 
through a government guarantee or backstop. Third, questions 
of fairness arise. For example, the government will support 
those who have been risk-averse and proactive in taking out 
pandemic insurance, yet it will also have to prop up those 
without insurance. Furthermore, in Type 4 some speci ed risks 
and sectors receive support while others do not. In light of this, 
a mandatory approach might be most appropriate for systemic 
risks, particularly for Types 2 and 3, where the cover involves a 
full government guarantee.
Despite being based largely on risk removal by the government, 
each of the types proposed indicates a valuable role for the 
insurance industry to play in acting as professional distributors 
of the insurance policies that will be backed by the government, 
as claims managers, and as experts in risk mitigation and 
prevention. Effective communication and exchange between 
the government and the insurance industry are, therefore, 
vital. In the short- to medium-term, redistribution of such risk 
(Figure 2) is likely to be dif cult to achieve; that is, pandemic 
risk or other systemic risks cannot easily be spread amongst a 
large pool of policyholders without government backing.
3. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to outline the solutions currently 
being proposed to address the pandemic insurance protection 
gap and provide a framework for evaluating them. As our 
Strategic Response Framework clari es, a government 
backdrop for risk removal will need to be involved when 
addressing a risk of such magnitude. The schemes that have 
successfully been launched (Type 4) are all temporary, with 
the aim of a return to the private market, which may not be 
possible in the short- or even medium-term. We, therefore, 
recommend ongoing dialogue and collaboration between the 
government and the insurance industry in bringing any of 
these proposed solutions (Types 1 to 3) to fruition as working 
insurance products that can ensure continuity of pandemic 
insurance for businesses. Furthermore, as businesses are the 
biggest carriers of these risks, it is important to include their 
needs and experiences in developing these solutions.   
Our Protection Gap Strategic Response Framework and its 
application to pandemic risk also have implications for other 
burgeoning systemic risks. While the pandemic is a signi cant 
event that has hit economies around the world hard, other, 
longer-term risks also need to be addressed to minimize 
insurance protection gaps. Rising global temperatures have 
caused a climate crisis in which extreme weather events 
such as  ooding, droughts, cyclones, and bush res have 
almost doubled to 6,681 events over the past 20 years, 
costing U.S.$4.07 trillion in global economic losses [UNDRR 
(2020)]. As much of this risk is underinsured, the burden of 
paying for such losses falls on governments and the affected 
communities and individuals. The problem is that the global 
insurance and reinsurance market that pays for such losses 
[Jarzabkowski et al. (2015)] will break down under the impact 
of climate change. If temperatures do rise by 1.5C by the end 
of the century, annual costs incurred by damages as a result 
of climate change could reach €71 bln compared to €22.9 
bln in 1981 [Smith and Arnold (2021)]. Yet, the relatively 
long-term impact of climate change forestalls a sense of 
urgency and can delay change [Slawinski and Bansal (2015)]. 
By contrast, sudden systemic shocks, such as the current 
pandemic, provide opportunities for learning about how to 
respond to the protection gap on other systemic risks. While 
climate risk differs considerably from pandemic risk in terms 
of the speed at which risks become uninsurable [Rosenthal 
et al. (2001)], nonetheless, urgent strategic responses to 
climate risk are needed. We, therefore, hope that this article 
provides grounds for considering some options through 
which governments and the insurance industry, alongside 
those policyholders who are increasingly affected, can 
plan their strategic responses in advance of a crisis or collapse 
of insurance.  
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